Beijing successfully negotiated the signing of a Border Defense Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) with India on October 23, 2013, which appears to be a Chinese conspiracy to undermine debate over its recent strategic offensive behavior. Although the agreement appears to have set a positive tone for future negotiations between New Delhi and Beijing, it does not lead to a significant change in Chinese policy. The last mechanism is a purely symbolic agreement that has not led to tangible progress on the ground. However, many in India saw the deal as a capitulation of Indian interests in the wake of China`s diplomatic arm. Indian media have argued that the deal has done little to ease tensions at the border. Chinese media hailed the deal as an attempt to resolve a long-standing border dispute. They described the deal as a success of China`s political leaders` commitment to resolving a long-outstanding border dispute. The deal was to include a hotline between the Chinese and Indian defense ministers, but Article IV states that this is something ”both sides can also consider,” in addition to lower-level communication exchanges. Both sides continue to strengthen their military presence along the disputed border. But the June 2020 confrontation resulted in casualties on both sides and a prolonged stalemate over the LAC. The withdrawal of troops is still ongoing and it is unlikely that both sides will be able to give up their vigilance in the foreseeable future. It is therefore obvious that the 2013 BDCA was never followed in letter or spirit, it sometimes flounders in dead ends at LAC, but there is a very obvious confidence in the search for a non-military solution to such problems. After each impasse, a spirit of de-escalation is visible, giving hope that the spirit of BDCA will remain alive.
The Sino-Indian border has always been a source of conflict between the two countries. Nevertheless, a sense of cooperation to maintain peace at the border has led to the signing of several bilateral agreements. The last of these agreements was the 2013 Border Guard Cooperation Agreement, the BDCA of which contained provisions that reflected a commitment to maintain peace at the border by avoiding border impasses. The abandonment of patrols was the most important step to avoid deadlocks between troops. The agreement also provides for channels of communication between the armed forces and a de-escalation of stalemates as they occur. But even after this agreement was signed, there were border disputes. The provisions of the agreement were not followed in the true sense of the word. The armed conflict between security forces in June 2020 was the most recent and virulent border crossing that calls into question the spirit of the 2013 agreement. Given the current situation, there does not appear to be an option to revive the BDCA agreement, but the agreement had the potential to create long-term peace in the LAC. In summary, it appears that the 2013 BDCA was an unfortunate causality of the Indochinese border conflict. Strong political commitment is needed to revive the agreement to maintain peace in the region. The two countries have signed a total of nine agreements, including one aimed at strengthening cooperation on transboundary rivers and cross-border traffic.
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said it would help maintain ”peace, tranquility and stability” at the border. It appears that China has managed to take the lead in drafting the BDCA by circumventing the main issue of border dispute settlement. There are no clear answers as to the exact difference between the BDCA and the other confidence-building measures that India already shares with China on the border issue. And in many ways, the BDCA is charged in favor of China. Before Singh`s visit to China, I wrote a rather critical article for The Diplomat, claiming that India`s handling of the crisis was strategically reckless. Rather, other commentators have argued that India`s strategy toward China is more nuanced than it seems at first glance. The BDCA may actually do little to reduce the likelihood of a border battle between India and China along the LoAC, but overall, the deal appears to be in India`s interest. It ensures that in the event of a blatant incursion, such as the Daulat Beg Oldi, there are a number of bilaterally agreed rules to defuse the situation.
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